Could antitrust laws theoretically apply to media organizations or alliances like the Global Alliance for Responsible Media?

Antitrust laws can indeed apply to media organizations or alliances like the Global Alliance for Responsible Media under certain circumstances. This application is primarily dependent on whether the behavior or structure of the organization restricts free and fair competition in the market.

1. Sherman Antitrust Act: The Sherman Act, established in 1890, made monopolies and any attempt to monopolize a market illegal in the United States (7 Miss. Admin. Code T. 7, Pt. 97)[1]. This act applies broadly across various sectors, including media.

2. Application to Media Cases: Historical cases have shown that media organizations can fall under the scrutiny of antitrust laws if they engage in practices that restrict competition. For instance, the Associated Press was scrutinized under the Sherman Act for using its by-laws potentially to coerce non-member newspapers, which could constitute a violation of the Act if such practices were proven (Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945))[2].

3. Specific Media-Related Rulings: In another case, it was determined that a news association was not automatically considered an antitrust conspiracy in situations where its activities were not competitive, indicating the nuanced application of antitrust laws depending on the specific competitive practices of media entities.

4. No Automatic Exemption for Media: It has been explicitly stated in cases that predatory practices or other conduct that would typically be unlawful under antitrust laws are not exempted just because they occur within a media organization.

5. Market Power Considerations: For antitrust laws to apply effectively, the organization in question must hold significant market power. Instances where media organizations did not possess sufficient market power to influence market conditions significantly have seen antitrust claims fail.

6. Overlap with First Amendment Rights: The application of antitrust laws to media organizations must also consider First Amendment rights. Courts have been cautious not to infringe upon these rights, ensuring that any antitrust scrutiny aligns with preserving competitive economic motives rather than interfering with protected editorial judgments.

Based on these points, if the Global Alliance for Responsible Media engages in practices that unduly restrict competition or seeks to monopolize the market, it could theoretically be subject to antitrust scrutiny. However, the specific facts of their operation and market influence would be crucial in determining the applicability of antitrust laws.

Cases, statutes, and regulations

1. 1.T. 7, Pt. 97. 7 MS ADC T. 7, Pt. 97“…Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: outlawed monopolies in the United States…”
2. 2.Associated Press v. U.S.Supreme Court of the United StatesJune 18, 1945326 U.S. 165 S.Ct. 1416“…Thus if it were shown that the Associated Press was using its by-laws to fix prices for news reports or to coerce non-member newspapers in some way, a clear violation of the Sherman Act would be proved. Under certain circumstances these by-laws conceivably might be employed for the purpose of coercing the non-members to join the Associated Press, to refrain from obtaining news from other sources or to cease operations. But no attempt has been made by the Government to allege or prove such facts and their existence cannot be assumed any more than we can presuppose unfair destruction of competition in order to justify the decree of the court below.…”“…Thus for the first time the Court today uses the Sherman Act to outlaw a reasonable competitive advantage gained without the benefit of any of the evils that Congress had in mind when it enacted this statute. On the main issue before us, the record shows a complete absence of any monopoly, domination, price fixing, coercion or other predatory practices by which competition is eliminated to the injury of the public interest. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491-501, 60 S.Ct. 982, 990-996, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044. And the District Court was unable to find otherwise. Nothing appears save a large, successful organization which has attempted to protect the fruits of its own enterprise from use by competitors. To conclude on such evidence that the Associated Press has violated the Sherman Act is to ignore the repeated holdings of this Court that the purpose of the statute is to maintain free competition in interstate commerce and to eliminate only those restraints that unreasonably inhibit such competition.…”
3. 3.Ralph C. Wilson Industries, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.United States District Court, N.D. California.November 28, 1984598 F.Supp. 6941984 WL 1138854“…Antitrust laws were designed to protect free market competition and not the financial success of any particular competitor and laws could not be used as a sword by plaintiff television station which was unwilling to pay going market price for exclusive programming licenses or news feeds, absent any showing that defendants acted unreasonably. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, S 1, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1.…”“…In summary, the court holds that plaintiff cannot prevail on any of its three antitrust claims. There is no evidence in the record to show that the defendants conspired to exclude plaintiff from quality programming or to enforce exclusivity against plaintiff. Nothing in the record shows that defendants acted anything but reasonably in obtaining and enforcing exclusive licenses, or in any other challenged practice. Rather, the record shows that plaintiff is unwilling to pay the going market price for programs or news feeds, and is seeking redress from this grievance by means of an antitrust suit. This is not the purpose of antitrust laws. Antitrust laws were designed to protect free market competition, not the financial success of any particular competitor. Nothing in the record shows that defendants’ challenged actions in any way have decreased or injured competition.…”“…Plaintiff filed this action on December 29, 1980. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants have violated the antitrust laws because of various practices they follow concerning the licensing of programs and conspiracies to boycott plaintiff. Plaintiff is pursuing three claims against defendants based upon these alleged practices. First, plaintiff claims that all defendants have violated the Sherman Act by unreasonably restraining trade. Plaintiff contends that defendants unreasonably restrain trade by licensing programs on an exclusive basis as against plaintiff, by making the licenses unreasonably long and by incorporating, implicitly or explicitly, rights of first refusal into those licenses. Secondly, plaintiff claims that the station defendants have committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act by a horizontal conspiracy to boycott plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that these three defendants have conspired, through direct communication, to exercise exclusivity of programming against plaintiff. Thirdly, plaintiff claims that defendant Miami Valley Broadcasting Co. has committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the Independent Television News Association (ITNA) to exclude plaintiff from membership in that organization. These three claims will be developed in more detail below.…”
4. 4.Newspaper Guild v. LeviUnited States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.July 01, 1976539 F.2d 755176 U.S.App.D.C. 276“…(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing, any predatory practice, or any other conduct in the otherwise lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrangement which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if engaged in by a single entity. Except as provided in this Act, no joint newspaper operating arrangement or any party thereto shall be exempt from any antitrust law.…”“…Furthermore, as we noted earlier, many arrangements without anticompetitive impact do not qualify for Attorney General approval given the statutory standard, and that as a result the District Court’s interpretation makes unlawful certain joint operating agreements that prior to the Newspaper Preservation Act were lawful within the meaning of the antitrust laws. See page — of U.S.App.D.C., p. 759 of 539 F.2d supra. We find such a result anomalous in an Act clearly designed to create an exemption to the antitrust laws.…”
5. 5.Flaa v. Hollywood Foreign Press AssociationUnited States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.December 08, 202255 F.4th 6802022 WL 17492256“…Entertainment journalists’ antitrust claims under California’s Cartwright Act mirrored their Sherman Act claims that foreign press association’s membership practices were unlawful restraint of trade and monopolization, and therefore the claims could be considered together. Sherman Act SS 1, 2, 15 U.S.C.A. SS 1, 2; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 16700 et seq.…”“…Second, the HFPA lacks market power. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294, 296, 105 S.Ct. 2613; Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458, 106 S.Ct. 2009 (noting that “the per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor”). As we explain in more detail below, the complaint does not plausibly allege that the HFPA-a group of 85 entertainment journalists, only half of whom are “active” journalists-possesses market power in any reasonably defined market.…”“…In the amended complaint, the journalists proposed a market definition of “reporting on news, events, and personalities related to American movies for media outlets outside the United States,” and they asserted that individual foreign countries constitute discrete geographic submarkets. The district court rejected that market definition as “artificially narrow” and “hopelessly muddled.” The district court also concluded that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that the HFPA possesses market power or that its membership policies harm competition.…”“…Members of foreign press association did not engage in a per se unlawful horizontal market division agreement to divide the foreign entertainment news market amongst themselves in violation of Sherman Act and California’s Cartwright Act, where members were generally not able to compete with one another because of the peculiar characteristics of each geographic submarket for entertainment news, and if members from different countries could not compete with each other, then they could not agree to divide a market. Sherman Act S 1, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 16700 et seq.…”
6. 6.AD/SAT, a Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated PressUnited States District Court, S.D. New York.February 29, 1996920 F.Supp. 12871996 WL 87238“…News association was not by definition antitrust conspiracy for purposes of case involving electronic delivery of advertisements to its members, which was not area of activity in which its members were in competition. Sherman Act, S 1, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1.…”
7. 7.Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc.United States District Court, D. Maryland.August 16, 2002223 F.Supp.2d 7182002 WL 1968305“…Any concerted action between newspaper publishers’ competitors was not shown to have resulted in an unreasonable restraint on trade, as required for the publishers to prevail on an antitrust claim under section one of the Sherman Act; the publishers had failed to define any relevant market, and the complained-of conduct did not trigger “per se ” analysis, despite claim that competitors had engaged in market allocation; nothing in the record indicated that the consumers (advertisers) were disadvantaged by the introduction of a newspaper with higher circulation and deeper penetration, or that such an introduction was of the type that would “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.” Sherman Act, S 1 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1.…”
8. 8.AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated PressUnited States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.June 23, 1999181 F.3d 2161999 WL 415326“…Although trade association with goal of encouraging technological development in newspaper industry and partnership with goal of increasing newspaper industry’s declining share of advertising dollars encouraged and assisted news association when it was developing service to compete with plaintiff’s newspaper advertising transmittal service, organizations did not participate in anticompetitive refusal to deal with plaintiff; to the contrary, organizations continued to promote other electronic delivery services, including plaintiff’s. Sherman Act, S 2, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. S 2.…”“…Newspaper advertising transmittal service brought action against news association, member newspapers, newspaper association and its chairman, and limited partnership organized to promote newspapers, for allegedly engaging in antitrust conspiracy and monopoly leveraging, and attempting to monopolize advertising transmittal market. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Peter K. Leisure, J., 920 F.Supp. 1287, granted summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) there was no dangerous probability that news organization would achieve monopoly power in relevant product market; (2) there was no tangible harm to competition in advertising delivery market, as required to support monopoly leveraging claim; and (3) plaintiff failed to submit evidence tending to exclude possibility that defendants acted independently, as required to support antitrust conspiracy claim. Affirmed.…”
9. 9.Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp.United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division.June 30, 1995892 F.Supp. 11461995 WL 405834“…In this case, there are various threats to CPI’s profits that are caused by anticompetitive aspects of the transaction. The court has already described the “must buy” phenomenon, whereby the Times and the Morning News will have such a dominant market share that any monopolistic increase in the combination’s advertising rates would soak up all the available advertising revenue. This “must buy” phenomenon, under which a price increase can actually injure competitors, is something which does not exist in most industries. While always harmful to consumers, monopolistic price increases usually benefit surviving competitors, who are able to expand their market share. Thus, in the typical situation, a price increase by the dominant market firm does not cause an antitrust injury. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, n. 8, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (horizontal price-fixing agreement can never harm a non-participating rival, who should actually benefit from the increased prices).…”
10. 10.Cass Student Advertising Inc. v. National Educational Advertising Services, Inc.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.April 15, 1974374 F.Supp. 7961974-1 Trade Cases P 75,019“…A company engaged in the business of acting as national advertising representative for college newspapers brought an action under the Sherman Act claiming that another similar company possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and had acquired and maintained that power with the intent to monopolize the relevant market to the exclusion of competitors. The District Court, Decker, J., held that plaintiff failed to discharge its burden of showing that representation of college newspapers in the national advertising market was itself a proper relevant market for antitrust purposes, but that the evidence instead showed that both plaintiff and defendant were in substantial rivalry with other publications and media and their representatives for all or part of the national advertising dollars directed toward the college market. Judgment for defendant.…”
11. 11.Berlyn, Inc. v. The Gazette Newspapers, Inc.United States District Court, D. Maryland.August 09, 2001157 F.Supp.2d 6092001 WL 901153“…Regional advertising cooperative which allegedly conspired with weekly newspaper conglomerate to drive competing newspapers out of business could not be held liable for attempt to monopolize, as it did not compete in weekly newspaper market. Sherman Act, S 2, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. S 2.…”
12. 12.Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.United States District Court, S. D. New York.July 23, 1980495 F.Supp. 6491980 WL 718453“…The essence of defendants’ First Amendment defense is that plaintiffs’ antitrust allegations seek to compel this court to do that which is prohibited under the First Amendment, to wit: to direct that defendants consider the purchase of news and documentary programs produced by independents for airing by defendants’ own stations as well as by their affiliates. Defendants reason that “in light of the serious First Amendment concerns raised by the present challenge to defendants’ journalistic policy, the Constitution requires a showing that it is anticompetitive economic motive which lies behind the challenged policy-not the exercise of protected editorial judgment.” Defendants’ Reply Memoranda at 33. They conclude that “(s)uch economic and anti-competitive motivation must be pleaded and proven to bring the claim within the reach of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 33-34.…”“…Thus, given the number of alternative sources for the programs in issue, it cannot be said that any of the network defendants has such a percentage of the market to be able to either control prices or exclude competition. To be sure, the network defendants, as well as the local affiliated and unaffiliated stations, are fiercely competitive with each other. This is especially true in the area of news productions. Wall St. Journal, April 11, 1980, at 1, col. 4 (“In this business (of news gathering), if a couple of stations do something new and it works, then everybody joins in. Everybody is looking for the latest competitive weapon”).…”
13. 13.Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Systems Corp.United States District Court, S.D. New York.September 04, 2002224 F.Supp.2d 6572002 WL 31010490“…2. YES does not have antitrust standing to pursue a claim for attempted monopolization of the alleged market for “sale of advertising time” solely on regional sports networks because no causation exists for YES’ alleged injury and alternatively, the injury is not cognizable as an “antitrust injury”.…”“…Cablevision claims that YES has no standing to challenge the purported antitrust action in these markets because (1) YES is not a team owner/advertiser so increased rates do not cause YES any harm; (2) YES is a buyer of television rights in the local broadcast rights market and a seller in the advertising market and as such, benefits from the alleged antitrust violation; and (3) YES is not the best suited Plaintiff, as the owners of sports broadcast rights and advertisers are an “identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement.” See Def.Mem.Law at 18-19.…”
14. 14.Belfiore v. New York Times Co.United States District Court, D. Connecticut.December 23, 1986654 F.Supp. 8421987-2 Trade Cases P 67,672“…Finally, as noted above, a publisher’s vertical integration does not violate antitrust law, absent proof that it “was intended to or did bring about some restraint of trade beyond the loss of business suffered by a distributor or the market’s loss of a distributor-competitor.” Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 803 (9 Cir.1976). As defendants’ point out, this principle is consistent with the general rule in this Circuit that a conspiracy that reduces intrabrand competition does not violate Section 1 unless there is an anticompetitive effect on the industry as a whole. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n. 5, 133-34 (2 Cir.) ( en banc ), cert. denied , 439 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed.2d 338 (1978). As discussed in connection with plaintiffs’ attempt to monopolize claim, there is no evidence that the Times, through its T-Route expansion, intended to or did accomplish a restraint on the distribution of newspapers.…”“…(W)ithout monopoly power or a dangerous probability thereof or some such adverse effect on competition, and not just on plaintiff as a competitor, the integration does not violate antitrust laws. The presence of the Eden Daily News, which has a greater circulation than the Greensboro Daily News, and the several other local newspapers in the alleged market belies any notion of monopoly power or dangerous probability of monopoly power in the distribution of newspapers.…”
15. 15.§ 45. Unfair methods of competition unlawful;  prevention by Commission15 USCA § 45“…No order of the Commission or judgement of court to enforce the same shall in anywise relieve or absolve any person, partnership, or corporation from any liability under the Antitrust Acts.…”

Administrative decisions and guidance

1. JOINT APPLICATION OF ALITALIA-LINEE AEREE ITALIANE-S.P.A., CZECH AIRLINES, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES, NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., AND SOCIÉTÉ AIR FRANCE FOR APPROVAL OF AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR ALDecember 22, 20052005 WL 4720924“…AIRLINES, INC., AND SOCIÉTÉ AIR FRANCE FOR APPROVAL OF AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR ALLIANCE AGREEMENTS UNDER 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308 AND 41309 JOINT APPLICATION…”“…propose to expand cooperation under the umbrella of the SkyTeam global marketing alliance. Specifically, they seek blanket statements of authorization to engage in reciprocal code shares and approval of, and six-way antitrust immunity for, alliance agreements covering foreign air transportation via transatlantic routings. [FN1] We…”“…online service options. We have also tentatively decided that granting antitrust immunity for the alliance agreements is not required by the public interest. We have…”“…circumstances, that the Joint Applicants have demonstrated that approval of antitrust immunity for the alliance agreements would provide sufficient public benefits. This tentative decision is…”
2. THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIESJune 01, 20112011 WL 2286864“…Communications Commission (F.C.C.) THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES The changing media landscape in a broadband age June, 2011 Executive Summary In most ways today’s media landscape is more vibrant than ever, offering faster and cheaper…”“…face a shortage of local, professional, accountability reporting. This is likely to lead to the kinds of problems that are, not…”“…be just around the corner, but at this moment the media deficits in many communities are consequential. Newspapers are innovating rapidly…”“…an impact. On close inspection, some aspects of the modern media landscape may seem surprising: > An abundance of media outlets does not translate into an abundance of reporting In…”
3. IN THE MATTER OF RESTORING INTERNET FREEDOMJanuary 04, 201833 FCC Rcd. 31133 F.C.C.R. 311“…of a Problem 3. Pre-Existing Consumer Protection and Competition Laws Protect the Openness of the Internet D. Restoring the Information…”“…information service framework will promote investment and innovation better than applying costly and restrictive laws of a bygone era to broadband Internet access service. Our…”“…are unnecessary because the transparency requirement we adopt, together with antitrust and consumer protection laws, ensures that consumers have means to take remedial action if…”“…6. Since long before the commercialization of the Internet, federal law has drawn a line between the more heavily-regulated common carrier services like traditional telephone service and more lightly-regulated services that offer…”

Additional secondary sources

1. THE FIRST ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA & THE LAW: HOW WILL THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BILL AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY AFFECT AMERICA?South Dakota Law Review41 S.D. L. Rev. 502Commissioner Andrew Barrett, former FCC Commissioner Senator Tom Daschle, Senate Minority Leader Gary Epstein, Esq., Latham & Watkins, Washington, D.C. Alex Felker, former Senior Vice President of Technology for Time Warner Telecommunications Ilene Gotts, Esq., Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C. Congressman Tim Johnson, Serves on the House Agriculture & Resources Committee Michael Katz, former FCC Chief Economist Senator Larry Pressler, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation Blair Levin, Chief of Staff for the Chairman of the FCC Clark Wadlow, Esq., Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C. Jim Abbott, President of Zylstra Communications Corp. Don Checots, Executive Director of South Dakota Public Broadcasting Dr. Don Dahlin, Director of the Political Science Department at the University of South Dakota Joe H. Floyd, President of Midcontinent Media, Inc. Scott Heidepriem, Esq., Partner in the Sioux Falls, South Dakota, law firm of…“…DR. WHITEHOUSE: [A question] primarily for Senator Pressler and second[ly] Commissioner Barrett regarding the recent explosion of media industry mergers, joint ventures and other alliances, Westinghouse, CBS, Disney . . . et cetera….”“…This horizontal and vertical integration seems to push the envelope of the antitrust law, yet seemingly with the blessing of the FCC, [the] Justice Department, Congress, and the courts….”“…I happen to believe the antitrust laws we have on the book are very strong and they should be enforced by the Justice Department and the FTC as they see fit….”“…[I am] hopeful that in the course of a conference committee that we can find bi-partisan agreement, something the President will sign, something that consumer organizations and senior organizations and others across the country can in fact support….”
2. COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE AS AN ANTIMONOPOLY STRATEGYPenn State Law Review124 Penn St. L. Rev. 1After decades of neglect, antitrust is once again a topic of public debate. Proponents of reviving antitrust have called for abandoning the narrow consumer welfare objective and embracing a broader set of objectives. One essential element that has been overlooked thus far is the ownership structure of the firm itself. The dominant model of investor-owned business and associated philosophy of shareholder wealth maximization exacerbate the pernicious effects of market power. In contrast, cooperative ownership models can mitigate the effects of monopoly and oligopoly, as well as advance the interests of consumers, workers, small business owners, and citizens. The promotion of fair competition among large firms should be paired with support for democratic cooperation within firms. Antitrust law has had a complicated history and relationship with cooperative enterprise. Corporations threatened by cooperatives have used the antitrust laws to frustrate the growth of these alternative…“…Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ․ organizations ․ nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws….”“…The relevant section of the Clayton Act provides that “[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit [.]” [FN156] A sponsor of the bill in the House described this exemption as making express what had been implicit until then: antitrust laws were not intended to apply…”“…Not all workers can avail themselves of the antitrust immunity, because of how the courts have interpreted the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. The antitrust exemption for the collective action of workers applies only to workers who are classified as employees under federal labor law….”“…. See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1983) ( “Federal policy has since developed not only a broad labor exemption from the antitrust laws, but also a separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor unions.”…”
3. ASSESSING THE MERITS OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY OBLIGATIONS AT LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH NETWORK LAYERSPenn State Law Review115 Penn St. L. Rev. 49The United States Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) that would codify rules aiming to preserve a free and open Internet for consumers. The NPRM concentrates on the relationship between end users and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), but also solicited comments on whether the Commission should apply one or more Internet openness principles as obligations on providers of content, applications, and services. Extending network neutrality obligations “over the top” of ISP traffic transmission links to and from content providers would apply an ill-advised and jurisdictionally suspect regulatory model. While the FCC’s public interest mandate may support some consumer protection regulatory safeguards against anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct of facilities-based ISPs, the Commission has no legal basis to regulate content providers and meddle with the robustly…“…See Pac. Bell Tel. Co., v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (holding that where the FCC has failed to investigate and remedy an instance where the wholesale price exceeds the retail price of service, courts have a severely limited basis to investigate further); Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that antitrust laws offer no additional safeguards when the FCC refuses to apply more aggressive safeguards available in the Communications Act, as amended)….”“…For these types of media, courts will examine laws that require FCC interpretation and the creation of regulations in the broader context of supporting public policy goals, especially ones articulated by Congress, as opposed to a narrower view that the resulting regulations directly affect content and the rights of a particular type of speaker, e.g., cable network operators versus television broadcasters….”“…Rather than treat VoIP carriers with the same sort of limited regulatory oversight it applies to information services, the FCC has saddled certain types of VoIP service with some of the regulatory burdens applied to conventional telephone service….”“…Ridding on top of this basic bitstream transmission conduit are communications protocols and standards like the Transmission Control Protocol that manage the routers that select networks to carry traffic and the Internet Protocol that establishes a globally used addressing system….”