by David Levin
Chapter 1: The Rise of the Fourth Branch
In 1984, the Supreme Court handed down what would become one of the most consequential decisions in American administrative law: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). At the heart of the case was a question about how courts should treat interpretations of ambiguous statutes made by federal agencies. The answer, provided in the now-famous two-step framework, would profoundly shape the balance of power among the branches of government—and give rise to what many constitutional scholars call the “fourth branch” of government: the administrative state.
The Chevron Framework
The Chevron doctrine provided that when a statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, courts should first determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the question at hand (Step One). If the statute is clear, that ends the matter. But if the statute is ambiguous, the court must proceed to Step Two: it must defer to the agency’s interpretation, so long as that interpretation is reasonable—even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently itself.1
This was a sea change. Before Chevron, courts often exercised independent judgment over statutory meaning. After Chevron, deference became the norm, effectively shifting interpretive authority from Article III judges to unelected agency officials.2
The Expansion of Agency Power
Far from remaining a narrow tool of judicial humility, Chevron deference became a blunt instrument of bureaucratic power. Federal agencies began asserting expansive interpretations of statutes under the shield of Chevron, often in areas with significant economic or political implications. This trend was reinforced by later Supreme Court rulings that broadened the application of Chevron to a wide range of agency actions—including informal rulemaking, adjudications, and jurisdictional determinations.3
Cases like United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), confirmed that even longstanding judicial interpretations could be overridden by agency “reinterpretations.” In City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), the Court extended Chevron deference even to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction.
Agencies thus began to wear three hats: they wrote rules (legislative), enforced them (executive), and interpreted them (judicial). In doing so, they blurred the very separation of powers that the Constitution was designed to preserve.
Enabling the Administrative State
Chevron didn’t create the administrative state, but it sure did supercharge it. By empowering agencies to define the scope of their own power, the doctrine invited aggressive rulemaking in every corner of federal regulation—from environmental law and labor to immigration and health policy.
As courts increasingly upheld agency interpretations that would’ve raised eyebrows under traditional scrutiny, the message became clear: if Congress hadn’t been explicit, the agency could fill in the blanks.4
This may have made modern governance more efficient—but it did so at the cost of democratic accountability. Instead of judges or legislators interpreting the law, we ended up with bureaucrats doing all three jobs.
It wasn’t just a doctrinal shift. It was a quiet revolution.
In the next chapter, we’ll unpack the Chevron doctrine in more detail—how courts actually applied it, where it made sense, and how it became a tool for regulatory creep.
1 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
2 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2008).
3 See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30; Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81; City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296–97.
4 See Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 761, 770 (2014) (explaining how permissibility under Chevron became a default basis for upholding broad interpretations).
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